Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
JIMMY
BANTING, ALFRED G.R. No. 158867
REYES
and MAXIMA ARCENO
REYES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
SPS.
JOSE MAGLAPUZ and
RAYMUNDA
BANDIN
MAGLAPUZ, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 22, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court praying that we (1) declare the
Decision[1] dated
August 13, 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79, Las Piñas City (MeTC)
as null and void; (2) declare the Order[2] dated
February 4, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Piñas City
(RTC) as null and void; and (3) reverse and set aside the Resolution[3] dated May
16, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An ejectment complaint was filed with
the MeTC entitled, “Sps. Jose Maglapuz & Raymunda Bandin-Maglapuz,[4] represented
by their Attorney-in-Fact Rosalinda Maglapuz-Agulay, Plaintiffs, v. Jimmy
Banting and Sps. Alfred Reyes and Maxima Arceno-Reyes, Defendants” and
docketed as Civil Case No. 5663.[5] It involved the right to possession of a
parcel of land located at No. 405 Real
Street, Talon I, Las Piñas City, containing an area of 258 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44306 registered in the
name of the Heirs of Victoriana Ramos.[6] Raymunda Maglapuz is purportedly one of the
heirs.[7]
The complaint alleged that spouses Alfred
and Maxima Reyes (Spouses Reyes) paid
rent to the Spouses Jose and Raymunda
Maglapuz (Spouses Maglapuz) for the use of the property from 1994 to August 1997
at the rate of P3,500.00 per month; that beginning September 1997, however,
Spouses Reyes stopped paying rent;[8] that spouses Maglapuz served a letter dated
August 9, 1999 on Spouses Reyes demanding that the latter pay their rentals
and vacate the property;[9] that this was received by Spouses Reyes on
August 12, 1999;[10] that when no payment was made, Spouses
Maglapuz filed said Civil Case No. 5663 against Spouses Reyes impleading Jimmy
Banting (Banting) with whom Spouses Reyes entered into a partnership for the
operation of a grocery store on the subject property.
Defendants Spouses Reyes and Banting
filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[11] They
argued that Spouses Maglapuz have no cause of action against them for their
possession of the subject property is lawful as it is based on a contract of
lease executed in their favor by one named Carmencita dela Cruz, allegedly the
rightful owner of the property. They demanded compensation by way of moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the allegedly vexatious suit
filed against them. [12]
After
preliminary conference and submission of position papers, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Maglapuz. The decretal portion of the
August 13,
2002 Decision of the MeTC reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants for the following:
1) Ordering the defendants to vacate the plaintiff’s property and to return possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
2)
Ordering the defendant to pay rental of P3,500.00
per month from September 1997 up to the time they have finally vacated the
premises;
3)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00
attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 per
court appearance;
4)
To pay cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
From
the foregoing decision, Spouses Reyes and Banting appealed to the RTC (Branch 199, Las Pinas City)[14] which issued an Order dated September 27,
2002 directing the parties to file their respective memoranda on appeal within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.[15] The records reveal that defendants-appellants
Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of the Order on October 7, 2002.[16] Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Maglapuz filed a Memorandum
on Appeal.[17] Spouses Reyes and Banting did not file any
memorandum.
In an Order dated November 21, 2002, the RTC
dismissed the appeal, thus:
It
appearing that Defendants-Appellants failed to comply with the Order of this
Court dated September 27, 2002 and pursuant to Section 3 Rule 7 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Spouses Reyes and Banting received
copy of the Order on December 4, 2002.[19]
Earlier,
however, on December 2, 2002, Atty. Dionisio Landero, collaborating counsel of the counsel of
record, Atty. Jose Espinas, filed an
Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum
for Defendants-Appellants.[20] He
attached thereto a “Memorandum for
Defendants Spouses Alfred Reyes and Maxima Arceno Reyes.”[21] Counsel
explained that the delay in filing the
memorandum on appeal was due to excusable negligence attributable to his
clients who called his attention to the need to file a memorandum on appeal
only on November 27, 2002. Prior to that date, counsel was not aware of any
order for submission of memorandum as he did not receive copy of the September
27, 2002 Order.[22] He asked that the memorandum on appeal be
admitted for it is meritorious in substance.
Specifically, it impugns the jurisdiction of the MeTC to issue the
August 13, 2002 Decision on the following grounds: first, the complaint for
ejectment was premature as Spouses Maglapuz failed to comply, much less allege
compliance, with the requirement of
prior referral of a case to the barangay council for conciliation under Section
12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court in relation to paragraph c, Section 409, Chapter 7, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code);
second, the case is actually one of accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC for it was filed
only in 1999, more than one year from the time possession of the subject
property by Spouses Reyes and Banting allegedly became unlawful in 1997; and
third, Spouses Maglapuz utterly failed to establish their title to the property
as would justify their claim to a better right of possession of the property.[23]
The
RTC rebuffed the motion for reconsideration. It held
in its Order of January 7, 2003 that the delay in filing the memorandum
on appeal was due to the inexcusable negligence of both counsel and clients who
were given sufficient notice to file memorandum but, for lack of coordination,
failed to do so.[24]
Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of
this Order on January 20, 2003.[25] On that same day, they filed with the RTC a
Notice of Appeal.[26] The RTC, in an Order dated January 23, 2003,
disapproved the Notice of Appeal for failure of Spouses Reyes and Banting to
pay appellate court docket fees.[27] The
latter received copy of this Order on January 27, 2003. On the next day, it
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that appellate court docket
fees were actually paid on January 21, 2003 as shown by copies of receipts
attached to the motion.[28] The RTC
granted said Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated January 30, 2003,[29] in
effect giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to the CA.
On February 4, 2003, however, the RTC
issued the following Order:
This court notes that the Notice of Appeal availed of by the defendants
is misplaced under the circumstances. The proper remedy provided for by law is
the filing of a Verified Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals paying
at the same time to the said court the corresponding docket fees and furnishing
this court and adverse party with a copy of the Petition.
In view thereof, the Order dated
SO
ORDERED.[30]
Through counsel, Spouses Reyes and
Banting received copy of the foregoing Order on February 19, 2003.[31]
Straightaway, they filed on February
24, 2003 a Petition for Review with the CA and paid on the same day the
corresponding appellate docket fees.[32] They
also served copies of the petition on the RTC and the adverse parties.[33]
The CA dismissed the petition in the
herein assailed Resolution dated May 16, 2003, portions of which read:
The
petition deserves but a short shrift.
1. We
cannot review, much less declare null and void, the Decision of the MeTC xxx
dated August 13, 2002 (not August 6, 1992 as stated in the prayer of the
petitioners; or August 13, 2003, as alleged in page 3 of the petition) for the
simple reason that we have no appellate jurisdiciton over it.
2. For the same reason of lack of jurisdiction
we cannot order the dismissal of the compliant for ejectment x x x;
3. The Order of the RTC dated January 23, 2003 is correct at bottom, as the RTC rightly denied due course to the petitioners’ notice of appeal; only its reasoning was faulty;
4. We have no legal basis for awarding private
respondents damages and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DISMISSED
outright.
SO ORDERED. [34]
Petitioners
Spouses Reyes and Banting filed a Motion for Reconsideration[35] from
the foregoing resolution but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
June 19, 2003.[36]
Undaunted, petitioners’ newly appointed counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Admit
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a Motion for Reconsideration
attached thereto.[37] The CA
merely took note of this motion.[38]
Hence,
the present petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS IS COMPETENT TO REVIEW OR DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE DECISION DATED AUGUST 13, 2002 RENDERED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL IS CORRECT.
III.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE ITS BEING MERITORIOUS, CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH DECIDED THE CASE ON THE MERITS, DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION.
IV.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE ITS BEING MERITORIOUS, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPER ACTION TO BE FILED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACTION PUBLICIANA OR ACTION REIVI[N]DICATORIA, RATHER THAN A CASE FOR EJECTMENT.
V.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONERS’ FORMER COUNSEL IN FAILING TO FILE A MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL TO THE UTTER PREJUDICE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.[39]
Upon
motion of respondents, we granted the substitution of deceased-respondent
Raymunda Bandin-Maglapuz by her heirs,
namely: Jose Maglapuz, Ricardo Manahan,
Angelita Maglapuz, Rodelio Maglapuz, Mauro Maglapuz, Emelita Maglapuz, Lolita
Maglapuz-Lagmay, and Rosalinda Maglapuz-Agulay,[40] as
party respondents.
The petition lacks merit.
The principal issue underlying the petition is whether the CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Review of petitioners.
Appeal by petition for review under
Rule 42 filed with the CA is the appropriate remedy from decisions or final orders issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.[41] Section 1 of Rule 42 reads:
Section
1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from
a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals x x x. The petition shall be
filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. x
x x.
An order of the RTC dismissing an appeal from a decision of the MeTC
for failure of appellant to file a memorandum on appeal is one such final
order.[42] It is appealable
by petition for review under Rule 42.[43]
In the instant case, the November 21,
2002 and January 7, 2003 RTC Orders dismissed petitioners’ Appeal from the
August 13, 2002 MeTC Decision for their failure to file a memorandum on appeal.
These orders were therefore appealable by petition for review with the CA. The Notice of Appeal petitioners initially
filed was clearly erroneous. Petitioners sought to rectify their error by
filing the Petition for Review with the CA on February 24, 2003. The question
then is whether such recourse would prosper.
In
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[44] we fixed a uniform period for appeals filed
under Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45. Specifically,
we set the period to appeal at 15 days
from notice of the decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is seasonably filed from the said decision or final order,
within a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial or reconsideration.
Applying
the foregoing rule to the present case, petitioners should have filed the
Petition for Review on February 5, 2003.
To recall, petitioners received notice of the November 21, 2002 RTC Order on
December 4, 2002. Even before that,
however, they were able to file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on
December 2, 2002. This was denied by the RTC in its January 7, 2003 Order. Notice
of said Order was received by petitioners on January 20, 2003. Hence, they had a fresh period of 15 days or
until February 5, 2003 to file a
petition for review.
As it were, however, petitioners filed instead a
Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2003. Such
mode of appeal under Section 2 (a) of
Rule 41 was faulty. Recourse to it did not toll the running of the period
within which to file a petition for review. It is axiomatic that a fatally
defective or erroneous appeal or motion will
not toll the running of a period to appeal. A detour from the proper course of an appeal
will not earn for the errant party a fresh start.[45]
Petitioners
therefore got entangled in an erroneous mode of appeal and squandered away the
remaining time it had to file a petition for review. The Petition for Review they filed with the CA
on
Moreover,
the said Petition for Review was fatally defective. The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants-Appellants,
now the herein Petitioners respectfully pray this Honorable Court, the
following:
a) To issue a writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order ex-parte upon the filing of this Petition;
b) That upon due consideration of the Petition,
an order be issued making the Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
permanent until after the final resolution of the instant Petition;
That after due notice and consideration of
the herein Petition, Petitioner further pray the following:
c) To issue an Order declaring the subject
Decision Annex “C” of the
d) Ordering the Complaint dated
e) Ordering the Order [sic] of the Public
Respondent Court RTC 199 dated January 23, 2003 null and void; and
f) Furthermore, ordering the Private Respondent
to pay the herein Petitioner damages and attorneys fees to be determined by the
Honorable Court.[47]
The Petition for Review was directed at both the August 13, 2002
Decision of the MeTC and
the January 23, 2003 Order of
the RTC. This is odd. The
All told, the CA
did not err in dismissing their Petition for Review for it was not only tardy
but also fatally defective.
We will, nonetheless,
briefly treat the substance of the petition for review with the CA, if only to settle
the issue whether or not the RTC committed an error in dismissing petitioners’
appeal on the ground that no memorandum on appeal has been filed by them.
The RTC validly
dismissed the appeal of petitioners from the
The appeal
was deemed abandoned when petitioners failed to file their memorandum on appeal
despite sufficient time given to them by the court. A memorandum on appeal or an appeal brief is vital
to an appeal for only
errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum
will be considered in the decision on the merits, except those affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.
Hence, the lack of a memorandum on appeal is ground for the dismissal of an
appeal.[49]
The excuse
proffered by counsel for petitioners for their failure to file the memorandum
of appeal did not help their cause any. Assuming that he did not receive copy
of the
We stop short,
however, from declaring the negligence of counsel as gross so as to liberate
petitioners from the effects of their failure to file a memorandum on appeal.
This is actually what petitioners would have us uphold. [52] They claim that their counsel’s negligence
was so gross that they were virtually deprived of due process and
representation in the proceedings below.
Such argument
fails to impress. We refer petitioners to
their Entry of
Appearance with Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum
for Defendants-Appellants.[53]
There they specifically argued that the failure of their counsel to file the
memorandum on appeal was “x x x by reason of his excusable negligence.”[54] Petitioners cannot now turn around and claim that
the negligence of their counsel is gross and that they may be said to have been
deprived of due process.
In the interest
of substantial justice, we deem it likewise necessary to resolve the other
issues raised by petitioners.
They argue that
the MeTC had no jurisdiction to issue the
Such arguments lack
merit.
It is settled
that the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code that a case
be referred for conciliation before the Lupon
as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the
real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or municipality.[56]
Here, the complaint filed with the MeTC specifically alleged that the parties
reside in different barangays and cities.[57]
As to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, this can be
determined from the complaint itself. It plainly states that the last demand
was made by respondents upon petitioners on
All told, the
appeal of petitioners fell short even on the merits. It was properly dismissed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 143-150.
[2]
[3] Penned by Associate Justice
Salvador S. Valdez, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Bienvenido
L. Reyes and Danilo B. Pine, rollo, pp. 29-34.
[4] Spelled as “Bandin-Manlapuz” in other pleadings.
[5] Records,
p. 1.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] CA rollo, p. 2.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[40]
[41] Section 2(b), Rule 41; Section 1, Rule 42.
[42] Elsie
Ang v. Dr. Erniefel Grageda, G.R. No. 166239, June 8, 2006.
[43] Gonzales v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 151376,
[44] G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005,
469 SCRA 633, 639; see also Donato Sumaway v.
Urban Bank, Inc.,
G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006; Apuyan v. Haldeman, G.R. No. 129980,
September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 402, 418.
[45] National Commercial Bank of
[46] This should be
[47] CA rollo, p. 9.
[48] See note 31.
[49] Elsie Ang v. Dr. Erniefel Grageda,
supra note 42; Gonzales v. Gonzales, supra note 43, at 66; Enriquez
v. Court of Appeals, 444
Phil. 419, 428 (2003).
[50] Zarate
v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160976, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 785,
796-797.
[51] Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de Leon, 422 Phil. 214, 221 (2001).
[52] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[53] See note 22.
[54]
[55] Rollo, 17-21.
[56] Pascual
v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830,
November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 268, 274.
[57] Records, p. 1.
[58] Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin,
G.R. No. 165177,